1. The petitioner has mainly approached this court with a grievance that there is no policy restraining the citizens from bursting crackers on public streets and, therefore, it has been prayed in the petition that the respondents should be directed to frame some policy restraining or regulating bursting of crackers on public streets/roads.

2. The circumstances in which the petitioner has approached this court, in a nutshell, are as under:

2.1 On 10.2.2003, when the petitioner was passing through a road in Sabarmati area of Ahmedabad with her son Aryan, aged about 2 1/2 years, a marriage procession of son of respondent No. 5 was passing through the said road and the members of the procession were also bursting fire crackers on the road as a part of celebration. All of a sudden, one of the fire crackers bursted in such a way that it hit and damaged one of the eyes of the petitioner's son, named, Aryan. The child started bleeding from his right eye and he had to be rushed to a hospital. In spite of all possible efforts of the doctors, Aryan lost sight of his right eye. The doctors treating the child have opined that the child will never have vision in the eye which has been lost due to the damage caused by the cracker. It has been stated by the petitioner that she had spent substantial amount of money for treatment of the child, but all her efforts were in vain as the child is unable to see through the damaged eye even today.

2.2 In the aforesaid circumstances the petitioner has approached this court with a prayer that the government authorities should be directed to frame a policy or enact some rules and regulations banning bursting of crackers on public streets/roads and Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 should be directed to pay compensation to the petitioner.

3. Looking to the nature of litigation, the learned single Judge before whom the petition was notified for hearing directed that the petition should be treated as a public interest litigation and, therefore, this petition has been placed before this court.

4. We have heard the learned advocate for the petitioner and learned Addl. Advocate General Shri Kamal Trivedi appearing with AGP Ms Sangita Vishen for the government authorities. In spite of service of notice of this court upon respondents Nos. 4 and 5, the parents of the bride and the bridegroom, they have preferred not to appear before this court.

5. Upon perusal of the averments made in the petition, which have been supported by medical certificates issued by medical officers of a government as well as a private hospital, correctness of the averment made in the petition regarding permanent damage caused to the right eye of the child cannot be doubted. In absence of any denial to the averments regarding the damage caused to the child's eye, we come to the conclusion that the child has lost his right eye as a result of the afore stated mishap.

6. In pursuance of notice issued by this court, an affidavit-in-reply has been filed by respondent No. 1 denying that there is no policy banning or regulating bursting of crackers on public streets. It has been stated that, in pursuance of powers given to the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City, under the provisions of Section 33 of the Bombay Police Act, an order dated 13.11.1997 had been issued by him, whereby it has been ordered that crackers should not be bursted on public streets in the city of Ahmedabad during marriage processions or religious, social or political meetings. The Police Inspector, Sabarmati Police Station, in his affidavit-in-reply, has also submitted that an FIR had been filed by the petitioner on 11.2.2003 and in pursuance of the said FIR, investigation had been initiated by him.

7. Alongwith an affidavit dated 25.3.2004, the Dy. Commissioner of Police, Traffic Branch, Ahmedabad City, has annexed a copy of the order issued by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City, dated 13.11.1997, whereby bursting of crackers on footpaths and public streets during marriage processions, religious and social meetings has been banned. In the said affidavit, he has further stated that no permission for bursting of crackers on public streets is being granted by the authorities.

8. In the course of hearing of the petition, it was felt that the aforestated order issued by the Commissioner of Police was not given due publicity and therefore the respondent authorities were directed to give due publicity to the said order. Accordingly due publicity was given to the said order dated 13.11.1997 and an affidavit stating the said fact was filed on 17.4.2004 by the Dy. Commissioner of police, Traffic Branch, Ahmedabad City, It has been stated in the said affidavit that the contents of the said order had been published practically in all leading newspapers and even contents of the said order had been telecast through Doordarshan. Moreover, banners stating that bursting of crackers is banned had been also displayed at several prominent places in Ahmedabad City. Thus, all possible efforts were made by the respondent government authorities to see that people are informed about the order dated 13.11.1997, whereby bursting of crackers has been banned on public streets. It has been further stated that people were also informed that bursting of crackers on public streets is an offence. Copies of the press notes released by the government authorities have been annexed to the said reply. At the time of hearing of the petition, the learned Addl. Advocate General has further submitted that the people residing in other parts of the State shall also be informed that bursting of crackers on public streets has been banned as stated hereinabove so that people may not burst crackers on public streets for the purpose of celebrating such events.

9. In view of the statements made by responsible police officers in the affidavits filed before this Court as well as upon recording statement of the learned Addl. Advocate General, we are satisfied that due efforts are being made to see that bursting of crackers at public streets has not only been banned, but sufficient efforts are also being made to see that people are being about the said restriction.

10. Moreover, The Environment (Protection) Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules) are very much in existence which also deal with control and regulation of noise pollution. Bursting of crackers also pollute the environment and, therefore, item No. 89 in Schedule I to the said Rules provide as under:

89. Noise Standard for Fire-crackers

A. (i) The manufacture, sale or use of fire-crackers generating noise level exceeding 125dB(AI) or 145dB(C) at 4 meters distance from the point of bursting shall be prohibited.

(ii) For individual firecrackers constituting the series (joined fire-crackers), the above mentioned limit be reduced by 5 log 10 (N)dB, where N=Number of crackers joined together.

11. In addition to the above-stated Rules governing noise level of the fire-crackers, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with the noise pollution created by the fire-crackers In Re. Noise Pollution. While giving final directions in relation to fire-crackers, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 168 as under:

xxx          xxx              xxx

4. There shall be a complete ban on bursting sound emitting firecrackers between 10 pm and 6 am. It is not necessary to impose restrictions as to time on bursting of colour/light emitting firecrackers.

5. Every manufacturer shall on the box of each firecracker mention details of its chemical contents and that it satisfies the requirement as laid down by DOE, In case of a failure on the part of the manufacturer to mention the details or in cases where the contents of the box do not match the chemical formulae as stated on the box, the manufacturer may be held liable.

6. Firecrackers for the purpose of export may be manufactured bearing higher noise levels subject to the following conditions: (i) The manufacturer should be permitted to do so only when he has an export order with him and not otherwise; (ii) The noise levels for these firecrackers should conform to the nose standards prescribed in the country to which they are intended to be exported as per the export order; (iii) These firecrackers should have a different colour packing, from those intended to be sold in India; (iv) They must carry a declaration printed thereon something like 'not for sale in India' or 'only for export to country AB' and so on.

12. The above facts denote that there are sufficient legal provisions regulating manufacturing and bursting of fire-crackers and, therefore, there is no need to give any direction to the respondent government authorities for framing any policy with regard thereto as prayed for in the petition. It has been however submitted by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner that the aforesaid provisions are not much known to people at large and, therefore, the said provisions are often violated. We find substance in what has been submitted by the learned advocate and, therefore, we direct the Secretary, Home Department, that he should give directions to the concerned officers, who are concerned with issuance of licences for manufacturing or dealing in firecrackers that the firecrackers manufactured or sold by them should not be such which would make noise above the level prescribed in the aforesaid Rules. In the licence, which might be issued, the aforesaid condition should be incorporated and the officers concerned with implementation as well as supervision should see that the firecrackers are not sold in violation of any of the provisions of the aforesaid Rules and the final directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He is further directed to see that an overall restriction with regard to bursting of firecrackers on pubic streets is imposed in the entire state and due publicity to the said restriction is given.

13. The aforesaid direction shall be given by the Secretary, Home Department, to the concerned officers as soon as possible and preferably within four weeks from the date of receipt of the writ of this order by him.

14. Looking to the uncontroverted facts of the case, it is clear that a small child Aryan has lost his right eye only on account of bursting of crackers by the members of the marriage procession. Respondents nos. 4 and 5, the parents of the bride and the bridegroom, though served with the notice of this court, have not preferred to appear before this court and that also denotes that they do not dispute the said fact.

15. Looking to the peculiar facts of the case, and more particularly in view of the fact that a young child, who is now about 5 years old, has lost his right eye permanently, and as the averments made in the petition supported by medical certificates have not been controverted by respondents nos. 4 and 5, as a special case, we award a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as costs/damages to the petitioner. The said sum shall be paid by respondents Nos. 4 and 5 jointly and severally within one month from the date of receipt of the writ of this court by them. Be it recorded that the said sum of Rs. 15,000/- is not awarded by way of total damages. It would be open to the petitioner or any of the guardians of Aryan to take appropriate legal recourse for recovery of amount of damages from the said respondents or from any other concerned person because, as per averments made in the petition, approximately Rs. 40,000/- have already been spent by the petitioner for treatment of Aryan.

16. A copy of this judgment shall be forwarded to the Secretary, Home Department of the State of Gujarat as well as to the Director General of Police, Gujarat State so as to enable them to do the needful.

In view of the above order, the petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the above extent with costs as quantified hereinabove.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND

W.P. (C) No. 4798 of 2004

Appellants: Bhuneshwar Patel Vs. Respondent: State of Jharkhand and Ors. [2006(2)JCR238(Jhr)] Decided On: 06.02.2006

Hon'ble Judges:
R.K. Merathia, J.

1. Heard the parties.

2. Petitioner prays for an order, similar to the order passed by this Court in W.P. (C) 4080 of 2003 in the case of Mithu Ram on 16.8.2004.

3. Mr. Atanu Banerjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that several trucks were seized and the Divisional Forest Officer-cum-Authorized Officer, Hazaribagh was directed to dispose of the interim applications for relief, by order dated 10.7.2002, passed in W.P. (C) No. 186 of 2002, but he passed final order confiscating the trucks in question. He further submitted that one of the truck owners, Mithu Ram moved this Court and the matter was remanded back for taking afresh decision on merits.

4. However, Mr. Banerjee agreed that the petitioner's application for interim relief need not be decided separately, as the main confiscation case itself is to be decided on merits now.

5. Mr. Pradip Modi, learned Counsel for the State submitted that apart from the petition for interim relief, the petitioner also filed his show cause on 21.5.2002 in the main confiscation case and after allowing several opportunities, the said final order was passed after taking into consideration the relevant aspects of the matter and nothing further is required to be decided.

6. However, in view of the said order passed in W.P. No. 4080 of 2003 on 16.8.2004 (Annexure-8), order passed by the Divisional Forest Officer-cum-Authorized Officer, Hazaribagh in Confiscation Case No. 18 of 2002 as contained in Annexure-3 and also the order passed by. the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Competent Appellate Authority as contained in Annexure-7 are hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the Divisional Forest Officer, Hazaribagh to dispose of the Confiscation Case No. 18 of 2002 on merit after giving sufficient opportunity of hearing to the parties.

7. It is expected that, as the matter is old, the Divisional Forest Officer, Hazaribagh will dispose of the confiscation case of the petitioner in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order, if the petitioner and other concerned parties co-operate.

8. With these observations and directions, this application is disposed of.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI

Writ Appeal No. 529 of 2001

Appellants: Mulibash Hastasilpa Samabay Samity Ltd. and Ors.
Vs.Respondent: State of Assam and Ors.: AIR2006Gau113, Decided On: 01.02.2006

Hon'ble Judges:
B. Sudershan Reddy, C.J. and H.N. Sarma, J.

Acts/Rules/Orders:
Indian Forest Act, 1927; Assam Forest Regulation, 1891 - Section 3(3)

Cases Referred:
Suresh Lohiya v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1996) 10 SCC 397 : 1996 AIR SCW 4111

Disposition:
Appeal allowed

JUDGMENT

B. Sudershan Reddy, C.J.

1. The petitioners in CR No. 3627/98 are the appellants in this Writ Appeal. This Writ Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 27-9-2001 whereby and where under the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants.

2. The writ petition has been filed by the appellants herein with a prayer to declare that the finished products made of the bamboo and canes including the mats, chati, beti etc. are not 'forest produce' within the meaning of that expression as provided for under Section 3(3) of the Assam Forest Regulation, 1891, as amended from time to time.

3. The sum and substance of the case set up by the appellants in this writ appeal is that they are not required to obtain transit pass/permit for transportation of the said finished products. Learned Counsel for the appellants in support of the contention relied upon the Notification issued by the State Govt. on 4-5-1992, which is to the following effect:

GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM
FOREST DEPARTMENT, SECTT. BRANCH,
DISPUR.

No. ERS.160/91/13 Dated Dispur, 4th May, 1992

From : Shri S. B. Roy Choudhury, ACS Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of Assam.

To : The General Secretary,

Malibash Hasin Slipa Samabay Samiti Ltd., Banamali Road, Karimganj, Cachar.

Subject : Transit Pass of bamboo products (Beti & Chati) under Khadi Cottage Industries.

Ref: Your Letter dated 13-12-91.

Sir,

With reference to your letter quoted above, I am directed to inform you that for transportation of finished products including Beti & Chati No T.P. is required.

This cancels this Office letter No. FRS 160/91/12 dated 24th March, 1992.

Yours faithfully,
Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of Assam,
Forest Department, Dispur.

4. The appellants herein sought for appropriate relief virtually seeking enforcement of the Notification dated 4-5-1992 under which, admittedly, no transit pass/permit as such required for transportation of finished products including Beti & Chati. The Notification dated 4-5-1992 issued by the Govt. still continues to be in operation. The validity of the Notification dated 4-5-1992 is not the subject matter of the writ petition.

5. The learned Judge even after noticing the said Notification, framed the question requiring adjudication by the Court in the following manner:

(i) Whether the finished products like Beti & Chati can be treated as 'forest produce' for the purpose of transit pass?

In our considered opinion, framing of the issue itself was not required since nobody challenged the Notification dated 4-5-1992 issued by the Govt. clarifying that for transportation of finished products including Beti & Chati: no transit pass/Permit as such is required to be obtained. It is nobody's case that the Notification dated 4-5-1992 issued by the Govt. suffers from any infirmities or illegalities.

6. However, the question that falls for consideration is not res integra but squarely covered by the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Suresh Lohiya v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. wherein the Supreme Court while construing analogous provisions in Indian Forest Act, 1927 and having framed the question whether bamboo mate is a 'forest produce' as is this expression known to the Indian Forest Act, 1927, held that "... though bamboo as a whole is forest-produce, if a product, commercially new and distinct, known to the business community as totally different is brought into existence by human labour, such an article and product would cease to be a forest-produce. The definition of this expression leaves nothing to doubt that it would not take within its fold an article or thing which is totally different from forest-produce having a distinct character..."

That Court accordingly held that bamboo mate is not a forest produce.

7. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, there is nothing left as such for adjudication.

8. The learned Judge, however, took the view that Beti & Chati are nothing but split form of bamboo, which is capable of being transformed without any skill and, therefore, cannot be treated as finished products. The view taken by the learned Judge is a contrary to the view expressed by the Supreme Court. Whether Beti & Chati are the finished products is not an issue either in the writ petition or before us in this Writ Appeal. In the circumstance, the conclusion drawn in the Notification that Beti & Chati are the finished products and totally distinct from bamboo as understood in the commercial world cannot be interfered with. In the circumstances, we find it difficult to sustain the view taken by the learned Judge for dismissing the writ petition.

9. As noted (supra), it was a simple case where the writ petitioner sought for appropriate direction enforcing the Notification dated 4-5-1992 issued by the Govt., which is binding on all its subordinates. The authorities are required to implement and follow the Notification dated 4-5-1992 issued by the Government as long as it is in operation.

10. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment under appeal is set aside. Accordingly, this writ appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.

11. This order, however, shall not preclude the State Govt. to take appropriate steps, if it so desires, to make necessary amendment to the Notification dated 4-5-1992.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

O.P. No. 16323 of 1998(R)

Appellants: The Managing Trustee Vs. Respondent: State of Kerala and Ors. Decided On:31.03.2006 AIR2006Ker300

Hon'ble Judges:

K.S. Radhakrishnan and K.M. Joseph, JJ.

Subject: Environment

Acts/Rules/Orders:

Kerala Preservation of Trees Act, 1986 - Section 5 and 5(1); Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949; Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 - Sections 2 and 8; Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1978 - Section 8(C); State Reorganisation Act, 1956 - Section 5(2); Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963

Petition allowed

JUDGMENT

K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.

1. This original petition has been preferred seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Exts. P7 and P8 notifications issued by the Government of Kerala in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Kerala Preservation of Trees Act, 1986 directing the petitioner not to cut trees mentioned in the areas specified in the Schedule thereto except on the ground that the tree constitutes a danger to life or property or the tree is dead, diseased or wind fallen. Explanatory Note attached to

Ext. P8 Notification reads as follows:

Explanatory Note

(This does not form part of the notification, but is intended to indicate its general purport.)

As per the sketch prepared by the Assistant Director of Survey, Forest Mini Survey, the area computed is 44.1342 hectares in survey No. 2050 in Agali Village. The area shown as 11.7950 hectares on the sketch prepared by the Division Surveyor is only an error while computing the area and out of this 0.5422 hectares relinquished by Arya Vaidya Sala to Irumbakachola Road. Thus the total area restored to Arya Vaidya Sala is 41.1342 hectares. In this sketch a small bit on the Southern side comprising an extent of above 0.57 hectare is marked as Vested Forest which is within the compound wall of Arya Vaidya Sala. Government decided to restore this area also to the Arya Vaidya Sala. So the total area restored to Arya Vaidya Sala comes to 44.7042 hectares.

This notification is intended to achieve the above object.

Petitioner submits that the above mentioned notification is illegal and the petitioner's properties would not fall within the scope of Section 5(1) of the Kerala Preservation of Trees Act, 1986.

2. Detailed counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents stating that the area in question is a portion of Anakkaranam Malavaram in Pottassery village and supports large number of trees of spontaneous growth and it is felt that the petitioner may fell trees on restoration of the area and that would lead to wanton destruction of forest tree growth in the area resulting in the ecological imbalance and soil erosion. It is with a view to regulate the felling of trees available in the area the notification was issued for regulating the felling of trees as per Section 5 of the Act. It is also stated that Section 5 of the Act empowers the Government to restrict felling of trees with a view to preserve tree growth in private forests or in the cardamom hill reserve or in any other areas cultivated with cardamom by notification in the gazette. It is stated that the land is covered by the erstwhile M.P.P.F. Act and is a private forest within the definition of the Act and consequently Government is justified in issuing the notification under Section 5 of the Act.

3. Properties mentioned in the abovementioned notification was the subject-matter of O.A. No. 123 of 1977 before the Forest Tribunal, Manjeri. That was an application preferred by the petitioner herein under Section 8 of the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting & Assignment) Act, 1971 for a declaration that the properties mentioned therein is not private forest liable to be vested in the Government under the Vesting Act. Matter was elaborately considered by the Tribunal and the Tribunal held as follows:

The title of the petitioner to his property is not disputed by the respondents. Exts. A1 to A4 and A6 will prove the title of the petitioner and I find that the petitioner is the owner of the property...

There is every reason to hold that all these had been cultivated even prior to 10-5-1971. The medicinal plants and herbs cultivated in this property are agricultural crops. In the circumstances, I find that the property concerned in this petition is not a private forest as defined in Act 26 of 1971. As such it is not liable to be vested in the Government.

In the result, this petition is allowed finding that the entire extent of 130.90 acres of property concerned in this petition is not a private forest and that it is not liable to be vested in the Government under Act 26 of 1971.

The above order was appealed against by the State by filing M.F.A. No. 456 of 1978 and the same was dismissed by this Court by judgment dated 9-10-1984. Review petition, R.P. No. 64 of 1987 was preferred by the State under Section 8(C) of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1978 before this Court and the same was dismissed on 2-9-1992. Though matter has become final, lands were not restored to the petitioner and consequently filed O.P. No. 8139 of 1994 which was disposed of on 29-6-1994 directing the Government to consider and dispose of the representation dated 24-2-1993 and to restore formal possession to the petitioner.

4. Area of 41.2528 hectares was restored to the petitioner on 6-11-1995. Area of 44.7042 hectares was also restored to the petitioner as per the order in O.A. 123/77 of the Forest tribunal, Manjeri, vide Government letter dated 3-4-1998. Later Government issued two notifications, Exts. P7 and P8, restraining the petitioner from cutting and removing the trees from the area in question on the ground that the properties covered by those notifications are private forests. Notifications, as we have already indicated, were issued under Section 5(1) of the Kerala Preservation of Trees Act 1986. The said provision is extracted below for easy reference.

5. Prohibition of cutting of tree in notified areas: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, or in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority, or in any agreement or other arrangement, the Government may, with a view to preserving the tree growth in private forests, or in the Cardamom Hills Reserve or in any other areas cultivated with cardamom, by notification in the Gazette, direct that no tree standing in any such area specified in the notification shall be cut, uprooted, burnt or otherwise destroyed except on the ground that-

(a) the tree constitutes a danger to life or property; or

(b) the tree is dead, diseased or windfallen:

Provided that the provisions of this sub-section shall not be deemed to prevent the pruning of any tree as required by ordinary agricultural or horticultural practices.

(2) No person shall, without the previous permission in writing of the authorised officer, cut, uproot, burn or otherwise destroy or cause to be cut, uprooted, burnt or otherwise destroyed any tree in any area specified in the notification under Sub-section (1) on any of the grounds specified therein.

Explanation I : For the purposes of this section, the term "tree" shall not include any species of tree.

Explanation II. For the purposes of Sub-section (1), the expression "private forest" means any land which immediately before the 10th day of May, 1971 was a private forest as defined in the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971.

Explanation II to Section 5(1) states that "private forest" means any land which immediately before the 10th day of May 1971 was a private forest as defined in the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971. Therefore only those lands which falls within the definition of the Vesting Act, 1971 would fall within Sub-section (1) of Section 5. But under Sub-section (1) of Section 5, Government has got the power to issue notification to preserve tree growth in private forests, or in the Cardamom Hills Reserve or in any other areas cultivated with cardamom which in the opinion of the State is that it is a private forest. Private forest under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act has been defined in Section 2(f), which is extracted below for easy reference.

(f) "private forest" means-

(1) In relation to the Malabar district referred to in Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 (Central Act 37 of 1956)

(i) any land which the Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXVII of 1949), applied immediately before the appointed day excluding-

(A) lands which are gardens or nilams as defined in the Kerala Land Reforms Act, (1963 (1 of 1964).

(B) lands which are used principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon and lands used for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation of the same for the market.

Explanation: Lands used for the construction of office buildings, godowns, factories, quarters for workmen, hospitals, schools and playgrounds shall be deemed to be lands used for purposes ancillary to the cultivation of such crops;

(C) lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit bearing trees or are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop; and

(D) sites of buildings and lands appurtenant to and necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of, such buildings.

(ii) any forest not owned by the Government, to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 did not apply, including waste lands which are enclaves within wooded areas.

(2) In relation to the remaining areas in the State of Kerala any forest not owned by the Government including waste lands which are enclaves within wooded areas.

Explanation: For the purposes of this clause, a land shall be deemed to be a waste land notwithstanding the existence thereon of scattered trees or shrubs;

Forest Tribunal as we have already indicated has specifically found that the land in question is not a private forest within the meaning of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act and the same is not liable to be vested in the Government. Since the land is not a private forest within the meaning of the aforesaid Act and not a Cardamom Hill Reserve and that the area in question is not cultivated with cardamom, in our view, Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Kerala Preservation of Trees Act would not apply to the land in question. Reference may also be made to the judgment of the learned single Judge in Kottal Avishumma v. State of Kerala with which we fully concur. In such circumstances, we allow this original petition and quash Exts. P7 and P8 notifications since the lands in question are not private forests within the meaning of the Vesting Act, 1971.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD

SA No. 625 of 1994

Appellants: M. Prabhakar Reddy Vs. Respondent: State of A.P. and Anr. AIR2006AP386, 2006(5)ALD161 :Decided On: 14.06.2006

Hon'ble Judges:

V.V.S. Rao, J.

Subject: Environment

Acts/Rules/Orders:
Andhra Pradesh Forest Produce Transit Rules, 1970 - Rules 3, 4 and 5; Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967 - Sections 2, 20, 29 and 68

Disposition:
Appeal dismissed

JUDGMENT

V.V.S. Rao, J.

1. The appellant (hereinafter called, the plaintiff) filed suit being O.S. No. 72 of 1988 on the file of the Court of the II Additional Subordinate Judge, Warangal, for recovery of an amount of Rs. 20,295/- (Rupees twenty thousand two hundred and ninety five only) with interest by declaring that the search, seizure and collection of compounding fee of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) is illegal. In his plaint, he alleged that he purchased teak wood in two lots, got it sawn into sizes at two different saw mills and as he could not get permit, kept the cut teak wood at Ladella village with his cousin till 10-2-1988. When he was transporting the teak, the forest officials stopped the bullock carts, registered a case being P.O.R.No. 79/B/87-88 W/N, dated 20-2-1988, and imposed compounding fee. As he was threatened with arrest, he paid the compounding fee. He alleged that the seizure and collection of compounding fee is illegal and therefore, he is entitled to such declaration and refund.

2. The respondents (hereinafter called, the defendants) denied the allegations and asserted that unless and until a transit permit is obtained under Andhra Pradesh Forest Produce Transit Rules, 1970 (Transit Rules, for brevity), the timber cannot be transported and that the plaintiff paid the compounding fee on his own volition.

3. Based on the rival pleadings, the trial Court framed four issues. The plaintiff examined P.Ws. 1 to 3 and marked Exs. A1 to A6, whereas defendants examined D.W.I and marked Exs. B1 to B7. After considering the evidence and the relevant provisions of Transit Rules, the trial Court came to the conclusion that when a person transports sawn teak wood, no transit permit is required and therefore, the seizure and collection of compounding fee is illegal. Therefore, the trial Court decreed the suit. The appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial Court, aggrieved by which, the present second appeal is filed,

4. The learned Counsel for the appellant submits that when sawn teak wood is transported within the State, no transit permit is required and therefore, even if the petitioner was transporting the teak wood without permit, the second respondent could not have seized the teak and could not have collected the compounding fee. According to the learned Counsel, the action of the second respondent in imposing compounding fee is ex facie illegal and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to declaration of title and refund of the amount, which he paid under coercion. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader relies upon Rules 3 and 4 of the Transit Rules and submits that whether or not the timber is sawn into sizes, as and when the same is moved within the State or into the State, the same has to be accompanied by a permit issued under Rule 5 of the Transit Rules and therefore, the seizure of the wood is not illegal. Secondly, he submits that imposition of Rs. 20,000/- as compounding fee is legal and there is no frivolous attitude on the part of the second respondent.

5. The plaintiff admitted that he has been transporting the timber sawn into sizes without a permit. Indeed in the plaint itself, it was averred that as he could not get transit permit, he stored the sawn teak wood at the house of his cousin at Ladella village. The question, therefore, is whether a permit is required for moving the timber from one place to another ?

6. The term 'forest produce' is defined in Section 2(g) of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967 (Forest Act, for brevity) as under.

(g) 'forest produce' includes—

(1) The following whether found in, or brought from a forest or not, that is to say timber, bamboos, charcoal, rubber, cacutchour, catechu, wood-oil, resin, natural varnish bark, lac, mahua flowers, mahua seeds, myrobalans, tumki leaves, rousa grass, rauwolfia serpentina, adda leaves;

(2) The following when found in, or brought from a forest, that is to say—

(i) tress, such leaves, flowers and fruits as may be prescribed and all other parts or produce not herein before mentioned of trees;

(ii) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and moss) and all parts or produce or such plants;

(iii) wild animals, wild birds, skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk, cocoons, honey, wax, and all other parts or produce of animal and birds;

(iv) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including lime stone and laterite) mineral oil and all products of mines or quarries; and

(3) Such other produce as may be prescribed;

7. Section 2(q) of the Forest Act defines 'timber' to include trees fallen or fell, and all wood, cut up or sawn. Section 20 of the Forest Act prohibits any person from moving any forest produce. Section 29 of the Forest Act empowers the State Government to make Rules to regulate the transit and possession of timber and other forest produce. In exercise of this power as well as power conferred under Section 68 of the Forest Act, the Government has promulgated the Transit Rules. Rule 5 of the Transit Rules empowers the Divisional Forest Officer or an Officer duly authorized by him to issue a permit in respect of forest produce to be removed from the forest area or Government timber depots. Rules 3 and 4 of the Transit Rules require permit for transporting forest produce or timber. Those Rules reads as under.

3. No forest produce shall be moved into or from or within the State by land or water, unless such produce is accompanied by a permit therefor issued under Rule 5 and produced for check immediately only demand :

Provided that where the forest produce is imported into the State from any other State it is enough if such produce is accompanied by a permit issued by the Government of the State from where such produce is imported and the said permit shall be valid only for the transport of such produce and such quantity to the destination specified therein.

4. Timber exceeding 25 cms in girth at its thickest part and one meter in length, except timber sawn into sizes shall not be moved into or from or within the State of Andhra Pradesh, unless such timber bears a distinguishable Government transit mark of such description as mentioned in the permit authorizing the transit thereof accompanying the said timber.

8. Rule 3 of the Transit Rules prohibits movement of forest produce within the State, unless such produce is accompanied by a permit, whereas Rule 4 of the Transit Rules requires the timber exceeding 25 cms in girth to bear a distinguishable transit mark as mentioned in the permit before it is moved. This, however, excludes timbers sawn into sizes from bearing the distinguishable number. As seen from the definitions of the terms 'forest produce' and 'timber', forest produce includes trees and all other parts of the trees, whereas the timber means the trees fallen or fell. Therefore, timber is also forest produce and is a necessary corollary when Rule 3 of the Transit Rules prohibits movement of the forest produce within the State, it is not possible to accept any submission that the Rule 3 of the Transit Rules excludes the sawn timber. On a true interpretation of Rule 4 of the Transit Rules, it becomes clear that the limited exemption given to sawn timber is that while in movement, sawn timber need not contain distinguishable mark as described in the permit.

9. The learned trial Judge fell in error while interpreting Rule 4 of the Transit Rules in coming to the conclusion that the sawn timber does not require a permit. The appellate Court correctly interpreted and came to the conclusion that even sawn timber requires a permit. Insofar as compounding fee of Rs. 20,000/- is concerned, the appellate Court came to a correct conclusion. The allegations of coercion and threat were disbelieved by the trial Court and the plaintiff did not file any appeal.

10. For the above reasons, the second appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

Criminal Revision Petition No. 605/2004

Hon'ble Judges:

B.S. Patil, J.

Subject: Environment

Acts/Rules/Orders:
Karnataka Forest Act - Sections 62(1), 62(3), 63, 71A, 86 and 87

Cases Referred:

Ningappa Bhimappa Gundammanavar and Anr. v. State of Mysore ILR 1973 XXIII Kar 897

Disposition:
Petition allowed

Citing Reference:

** Relied On

Ningappa Bhimappa Gundammanavar and Anr. v. State of Mysore            **

ORDER

B.S. Patil, J.

Page 0792

1. The revision petitioners are convicted for the offence punishable Under Section 87 of the Karnataka Forest Act (for short ‘The Act'). Challenging the judgment of conviction and the order sentencing the accused for rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and also imposing fine of Rs. 5,000/-, both the accused are before this Court in this revision petition.

Page 0793

2. It was alleged against the accused that on 15.06.1993. accused Nos. l and 2 cut and uprooted sandal wood tree in the Government land and made 71 sandal wood billets worth about Rs. 14,000/- thus committing an offence Under Section 86 of the Forest Act. It was further alleged that they were found transporting the said 71 sandal wood billets in a Maruthi Van near Saragodu without valid license and committed an offence Under Section 87 of the Karnataka Forest Act. Both the Courts have held that the offence alleged against the accused Under Section 86 was not proved whereas the offence alleged Under Section 87 of the Act stood proved.

3. Among several points urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the important legal point raised is regarding violation of the mandatory requirement contained Under Section 62(3) of the Act which allegedly vitiates the conviction recorded against the accused. It is his submission that as required Under Section 62(3) of the Act, the Officer seizing the sandal wood is required to report the seizure and forward the seized material to the designated authorised authority under the provisions contained Under Section 71A of the Act. Neither in the evidence nor in the materials produced before the Court, there is anything to suggest that this procedure is complied with, is the submission. In this regard, learned Counsel has placed reliance on a decision rendered by this Court in the case of Ningappa Bhimappa Gundammanavar and Anr. v. State of Mysore (ILR 1973 (VOL.XXIII) KAR 897). It is further contended by the learned Counsel that the seizure is also not proved in accordance with law as none of the panch witnesses to the seizure are examined. He submits that seizure is also not attested by independent panchas but has been attested by the officials of the Forest Department His next contention is that there is delay in submitting the FIR before the Magistrate. He has lastly contended that admittedly, the investigation is conducted by two officials out of whom only PW-2 who conducted the major part of the investigation is examined but the higher Officer to whom the investigation was later on entrusted has not been examined.

4. Sri. Maqbool Ahmed, learned Government Pleader supports the findings recorded and the judgments passed.

5. Having heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and on careful perusal of the judgments under challenge, the only point that arises for consideration in this revision petition is:

Whether the judgments under challenge recording conviction of the accused-revision petitioners for the offence punishable Under Section 87 of the Act suffer from any manifest illegality warranting interference in the revisional jurisdiction?

6. As major emphasis is laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the violation of the requirements spelt out under Sub section (3) of Section 62 of the Act, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions. Section 62(1) Page 0794 deals with seizure of properly liable to confiscation. It provides that if there is reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any forest produce, the said forest produce along with all tools, boats, vehicles etc., used in committal of the said offence, may be seized by any Forest Officer or Police Officer. Sub-section (3) of Section 62, which is relevant to the present case, states as under:

(3) Every officer seizing any property under this section shall place on such property or the receptacle or vehicle (if any) in which it is contained a mark indicating that the same has been so seized, and shall, as soon as may be, (make a report of such seizure,-

(a) where the offence on account of which the seizure has been made is in respect of timber, ivory, firewood or charcoal which is the property of the State Government or in respect of sandalwood, to the concerned authorised Officer under Section 71A; and

(b) in other cases, to the magistrate having Jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure has been made:

Provided that when the forest produce with respect to which such offence is believed to have been committed is the property of Government, and the offender is unknown, it shall be sufficient if the officer makes, as soon as may be, a report of the circumstances to his official superior.

7. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that every officer seizing any property under the provisions of the Section is required to make a report of such seizure either to the concerned Forest Officer Under Section 71A or to the jurisdictional Magistrate, depending on the nature of the produce, Sub-clause (a) to Sub-section (3) of Section 62 mandates that where the seizure is in respect of an offence pertaining to timber, ivory, firewood or charcoal which is the property of the State Government or in respect of sandalwood, the report of seizure is required to be made to the Authorised Officer as per Section 71A. Perusal of Section 71A makes it clear that in respect of any forest offence committed involving sandalwood, the Officer seizing the property shall without any unreasonable delay produce the seized material together with tools, ropes, chains, boats etc., before the Officer authorised by the State Government not being below the rank of an Assistant Conservator of Forests.

8. The question in this revision petition is whether this requirement in the present case is complied with or not and if not what is its effect There is nothing on record to show that the Officer who seized these sandalwood billets submitted the seizure report to the Authorised Officer and forwarded the seized articles without any unreasonable delay as provided under the provisions of the Act namely Sub-section (3) of Section 62 read with Section 71A. In fact, the evidence of PWs-1 and 2 does not make any reference to the compliance of the aforesaid requirement Ex. P.1 is the seizure panchanama and Ex.P.6 is the enquiry report prepared in a format. A perusal of Ex.P.6 does not disclose that the report was forwarded to the Authorised Officer in compliance with the mandatory requirement of Page 0795 Section 63. There is no endorsement of any superior officers on this report endorsing the receipt of the same from the Officer who seized the articles. Therefore, in view of the absence of any material whatsoever either in the form of evidence of PWs-1 and 2 or in the form of documentary evidence placed before the Court below showing that the seizure was reported to the Authorised Officer or that the seized articles were forwarded to the Forest Officer as mandated under the provisions of the Act, it has to be held that there is violation of the requirements contained in Section 62(3) and Section 71A of the Act.

9. The next question is what is the effect of this violation and whether the conviction recorded against the accused gets vitiated. In the case of Ningappa Bhimappa Gundammanavar and Anr. v. State of Mysore ILR 1973 (VOL.XXIII) Kar 897 which is apposite to the case on hand, this Court placing reliance on two unreported judgments rendered earlier in Cr.R.P. No. 435/71 and Cr.R.P. 180/72 has held that the requirement spelt under Sub-section (3) of Section 62 is mandatory and violation of the same would vitiate the trial and the resultant conviction. It has to be noticed here that the provisions contained in Section 62(3) and Section 71A are designed to serve twin purposes of imposing safeguards, firstly, with a view to ensure that the seizure is resorted to in a responsible and accountable manner and secondly, the higher officials in the department are immediately apprised forwarding the seized produce. This requirement is mandatory. Failure to follow this mandatory requirement vitiates the seizure and consequently, the trial based on the said seizure also gets vitiated.

10. In view of the above, I have no hesitation to hold that the conviction recorded against the accused cannot be sustained. Hence, I pass the following:

ORDER

This revision petition is allowed. The judgments under challenge are set aside. The accused/Revision Petitioners are acquitted of the offence. The bait bonds executed by the accused shall stand cancelled. The accused are entitled for refund of the fine amount if any deposited by them.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

W.P. Nos. 22962/2006 and M.P. No. 1/2006

Appellants: Annai Indira Women Self Help Group represented by its Co-ordinator Mrs. Palliammal :Decided On: 08.08.2006

Vs.
Respondent: The District Forest Officer, Sathyamangalam Division, The Member Secretary cum Forest Ranger Bejalletti Village Forest Council, Bhavani Sagar Forest Range and The President Bejalletti Village Forest Council

Hon'ble Judges:

Prabha Sridevan, J.

Subject: Constitution, Environment

ORDER

Prabha Sridevan, J.

1. On the last hearing, the learned Counsel for the petitioner had made his submissions and had also requested that an order may be passed similar to the order passed in W.P. No. 27741/2005 which arose out of a similar issue. The petitioner is a Women Self Help Group comprising of Scheduled Tribe women who solely depend upon the minor forest products. The State Government in order to help the Scheduled Tribe women, created the Village Forest Council and gave the right to sell and control the minor forest products to such councils in G.O.Ms. No. 79 Environment and Forest Department dated 29.4.2003. The lease was granted in favour of the petitioner to sell the minor forest products at the fair price fixed by the respondents. The petitioner sought for extension of the permit. Accordingly, the lease was extended by the 3 rd respondent but the 2nd respondent has not permitted the petitioner to carry and transport the minor forest products and therefore, this writ petition has been filed.

2. In G.O.Ms. No. 79 Environment and Forest Department dated 29.4.2003, the public auction was abolished and it was decided that the right to collect minor forest produce free of cost to the women Self Help Group and other Swarna Jayanthi Grama Sarojdhar Yojana at a reasonable price through the Forest Council. However, the Forest Councils were formed and the respective Forest Rangers were appointed as Member Secretaries to the above Councils. The minor forest products which the petitioner collect, include grass, amla, kadukkai etc. According to them, the payment fixed by the respondents has been duly paid by the petitioner and inspite the extension of the lease period in their favour, the 2nd respondent is not granting permit.

3. Mr. Titus Jesudoss, learned Special Government Pleader, has produced the relevant Government Orders and guidelines. In G.O.Ms. No. 343 Environment and Forests (FR.VI) Department dated 8.8.97, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests is directed to take action to constitute Village Forest Council in every programme village as per the approved Memorandum of Understanding. The Memorandum of Understanding is entered into between the Forest Department and the Village Forest Council. The objectives inter-alia are:

...

iii) To involve local people through Village Forest Council (VFC) in planning, planting, protection, harvesting, managing and benefit sharing in management unit with focus on degraded forests.

...

vii) To ensure flow of employment generation and benefits to local people living in the management unit.

4. The responsibility and role of Forest Department as per this Government Order are:

i) To utilize the co-operation of Non-Governmental Organisation ( NGOs) and the local community to the best advantage in involving an effective Joint Forest Management (JFM) technique in the management unit (programme village/villages).

5. The 2nd respondent will prepare the Micro plan with the advice of the 3rd respondent Council and get the approval from the first respondent and the required funds will be released accordingly. It is the 1st respondent who has the power to exercise disciplinary control over the 2nd respondent and the 1st respondent will frequently inspect the work executed by the 2nd respondent. The responsibilities and role of the various Councils is also spelt out in this Government order.

6. The Government has also issued G.O.Ms. No. 342 Environment and Forests (FR.VI) Department dated 8.8.97 laying down the guidelines for implementation of the Joint Forest Management in Tamil Nadu. It is seen from this that the 3rd respondent has been formed for fully involving the local people in the planning and execution of works, protection, harvesting and benefits sharing in the management unit. In fact, the Council can, for a such members, one male member and one female member from each household if they are willing. This shows that the purpose of the scheme is to involve fully the local citizens in various management. The role of the Member Secretary as spelt out in Clauses 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 appears more to be focussed on the economic and financial aspect of the Council. There does not seem to be anything mentioned in these two Government orders delineating the power of the 2nd respondent. If the 2nd respondent has some reason to decline the issuance of permit, he shall give reasons for the same and pass an order otherwise it appears that being subordinate to the 1st respondent he cannot act contrary to the decisions of the 1st respondent or frustrate the benefit which the petitioner is entitled to by granting extension of lease by the 1st respondent by refusing to issue permits.

7. It is clear from the objectives of the implementation of the scheme that the Government intends the women of a deprived group of the local population to get the benefit by harvesting minor forest produce. This special provision have been made only to benefit the women of the Scheduled Tribe. This aspect of the matter shall also be borne in mind by the respondents. The scheme has as its goal the total participation of the local citizens so that the natural wealth of the forest is not depleted or destroyed in any manner. All that the women are allowed to harvest by the lease is dry grass, kadukkai etc. If the petitioner act contrary to the terms for which the lease is granted or if under the guise of obtaining permit in favour of the petitioner others are misusing the permit, it is always open to the 1st respondent to take action. But once, the 1st respondent has granted lease, the 2nd respondent, unless it is for a valid reason given, cannot deny permit to transfer and move the minor forest products that they have harvested.

8. In these circumstances, the writ petition is disposed of as follows:

The respondents 1 and 2 are directed to strictly implement the G.O.Ms. No. 79, Environment Forest (Forest 14) Department dated 29.4.2003 and in case, in contravention of the said GO, any produces of the forest are sold or there is any proposal to sell the same, the same can be stopped forthwith. Respondents 1 and 2 shall also bear in mind the object and purpose for which these guidelines have been issued and the scheme has been framed. The 2nd respondent shall issue the permit to the petitioner so that they can derive the benefits of the lease granted by the 1st respondent to the petitioner, unless he can make out reasons for denying it.

No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Writ Petition No. 3422 of 2006 and W.V.M.P. No. 1331 of 2006

Appellants: J. Mohana Vs. Respondent: The Commissioner of Police and Ors. : Decided On: 24.08.2006, (2006)4MLJ525

Hon'ble Judges:
P. Sathasivam and S. Manikumar, JJ.

Subject: Environment

Acts/Rules/Orders:
Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000 - Rules 2, 7(1) and 7(2)

ORDER

P. Sathasivam, J.

1. The petitioner by name J.Mohana, a resident of Rajaji Nagar 4th Street, Red Hills Road, Villivakkam, Chennai-49, has filed this Public Interest Litigation, seeking for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, directing respondents-1 to 4 to take appropriate and immediate action in the matter against 5th and 6th respondents as per law to control the menace of noise pollution emanating from the Evangelical Church of India at Door No. 27/152, Red Hills Road, Rajaji Nagar, Villivakkam, Chennai-49.

2. In the affidavit filed in support of the above Petition, it is stated that the house of the petitioner comes within Zone No. 4 and Division/Ward No. 62 of the Corporation of Chennai and adjoining her house on the northern and eastern sides, situates the Church run by the 5th and 6th respondents. For the past one year, the sound emanating from the said Church during the time of prayer and other services has reached and surpassed unbearable proportions with the decibel levels of multiple times than the audible level. Further, High Watt Loudspeakers are positioned towards south facing her house. The cacophony of high decibel sounds and the torrential hand claps while rendering the hymns from the said Church literally paralyses every activity of the petitioner and her family members due to the fact that the sound speakers are kept at just 8 feet away from the compound wall of her house. The church also periodically organizes special prayer meetings apart from regular meetings. The church is also conducting marriages, receptions, birthday and other ceremonial functions of its members with the facilities available for cooking and dining. Since the church is situated in the midst of a cluster of residential houses, the noise pollution created in the church premises poses a serious health hazard to the public in general and the family members of the petitioner in particular. The respondents are aware that use of cone speakers has been completely banned and, in spite of the same, the Church still makes use of the cone speakers. She made a representation, dated 12.01.2006, to respondents-1 to 4 herein, praying to take appropriate and immediate action in the matter as per law to control the menace of noise pollution emanating from the church of the 5th and 6th respondents. Though respondents-1 to 3 received the same on 18.01.2006 and respondents-5 and 6 on 25.01.2006 and 23.01.2006 respectively, there was no proper action. In such circumstances, she filed the present Writ Petition.

3. On behalf of the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board/R-2 herein, its Additional Chief Environmental Engineer, has filed a counter affidavit, highlighting their stand. It is stated that Ambient Noise Level Survey has been conducted by the Board officials in the premises of the petitioner on 17.2.2006 and 19.02.2006, both Friday and Sunday respectively, during which period, activities like singing songs/prayers/sermons were carried out in the Evangelical Church of India, located adjacent to the petitioner's premises. The time taken for singing songs varied between 2 to 3 minutes and for the prayer/sermons between 3 to 7 minutes. The report of analysis of Ambient Noise Level Standards is enclosed along with the counter affidavit. There has been no cone speakers placed in the church and the box speakers are placed inside the Church. During the time of noise level survey, two box speakers have been placed inside the church near the window facing the petitioner's premises on the northern and eastern sides. The distance of the petitioner's building to Church building is about 13 feet. The open area distance between the Church building and the compound wall is about 10 feet. The open area distance between the petitioner's building and the compound wall is about 3 feet. In the counter, the details regarding results of the Ambient Noise Level Survey conducted on 17.2.2006 and 19.2.2006, which are compared with the background noise level and the Ambient Noise Level prescribed in the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000, have been mentioned in a tabular form.

After narrating the same and after referring to the relevant Rule, viz., Rule 7(1) of the Noise Pollution (Regulation & Control) Rules, 2000, it is stated that the activities of the Church, ie, singing songs/sermons/prayers using song drums and other musical instruments with box speakers had resulted in the increase of the noise level more than 10 dB(A) Leq of the back ground noise level and also the ambient noise level standards, which is a clear violation of the provisions of the Noise Pollution (Regulation & Control) Rules, 2000.

4. In the light of the above pleadings, we heard learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondents. The counter affidavit filed by the Additional Chief Environmental Engineer, Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board, amply shows that the noise arising from the activities of the Church, ie., singing songs/sermons/prayers using song drums and other musical interments with box speakers, exceeded the prescribed noise level.

5. Rule 7(1) of the Noise Pollution (Regulation & Control) Rules, 2000 reads as follows:

A person may, if the noise level exceeds the ambient noise standards by 10 dB(A) or more given in the corresponding columns against any area/zone make a complaint to the authority.

Rule-7(2) of the said Rules provides as follows:

The authority shall act on the complaint and take action against the violator in accordance with the provision of these rules and any other law in force.

6. The information collected by the Board on two days, viz., 17.02.2006 (Friday) and 19.02.2006 (Sunday) show that the noise level was above the prescribed standards. This is, undoubtedly, in violation of the the provisions of Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000.

7. It is seen that as per Rule 2 of the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000, the District Magistrate / Police Commissioners are empowered to take appropriate action for violation of the said Rules.

8. When the report and the information furnished by the Pollution Control Board was brought to the notice of the 5th and 6th respondents, learned Counsel appearing for them informed this Court that, in future, the noise level will be controlled and it will not exceed the prescribed standard. The above statement made on behalf of respondents-5 and 6 is hereby recorded. We are of the view that no further direction is required, however, it is made clear that, in future, if there is any violation of the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000, and the noise level exceeds the prescribed standard, the Pollution Control Board or the prescribed authority/authorities shall take appropriate action to reduce the noise level by enforcing the Rules. In case of violation, the petitioner is also free to make representation to the authorities concerned including the Commissioner of Police, Chennai, and on such representation/complaint being made, it is needless to mention that the same has to be verified and appropriate action be taken to reduce the noise level.

9. With the above observation/direction, the Writ Petition is disposed of. No costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.

Equivalent Citation:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Writ Appeal No. 2079 of 2003 and Writ Petition Nos. 10937, 11076 and 15518 of 2003

Appellants: The Union of India (UOI) rep. by its Secretary to Government, Ministry of Environment and Forests Vs.
Respondent: Member Secretary, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority and Shri T.R. Balu, Honourable Minister for Environment and Forests, Ministry of Environment,2006(4)CTC460, (2006)4MysLJ: Decided On: 08.09.2006

AND

Appellants: Consumer and Civic Action Group (CAG) rep. by its Trustee, Mrs. Tara Murali, Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage (TNTACH) rep. by its Convenor Mr. P.T. Krishnan